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Abstract
We analyze a firm that produces a final good from multiple intermediates
that can each be sourced domestically or from a low-wage country. The model
explicitly incorporates that sourcing decisions of intermediates are interdepen-
dent. Equilibrium predictions depend crucially on a key modeling assumption—
the nature of the trade friction that foreign production has to overcome. If pro-
duction abroad involves a fixed cost, offshoring one intermediate unambiguously
facilitates offshoring of other intermediates. However, if production abroad in-
volves incomplete contracts, offshoring one intermediate almost always makes
it more difficult to offshore others. We illustrate that the pattern in prices
at which successive automotive parts are imported into the U.S. accords bet-
ter with the predictions of the incomplete contracting model, except for a few
countries with the best governance indicators.
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1 Introduction
International trade in manufactured products has been growing rapidly for decades
and intermediate inputs make up an increasing share of it. Hummels, Ishii, and
Yi (2001) illustrate that the value share of imported intermediates in exports has
increased by more than 30% from 1970 to 1990. Antra`s (2003) further highlights that
almost half of all trade in manufactures takes place within firm boundaries. Both
patterns suggest an important role for international fragmentation of production.
Some worry that this process is accelerating as new producers are rapidly being
integrated in global production networks and even production of advanced prod-
ucts switches to low-cost destinations. Because demand for different intermediates
is interrelated through final product demand, their sourcing decisions are naturally
connected. The particular question we pose is whether past decisions to offshore
production of fast-maturing parts leads firms to advance or delay offshoring of sub-
sequent parts.
We first study theoretically how the offshoring decisions of different intermedi-
ates influence each other in a model that generates a product life-cycle. Production
switches from high-wage to low-wage locations as goods mature and inputs are stan-
dardized. Antra`s and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) have argued that theoretical insights
depend crucially on proper modeling of the organizational aspects of production.
We demonstrate that two alternative ways of introducing the cost of producing in
the low-wage location—using incomplete contracts or fixed costs—lead to opposing
predictions. We then investigate which modeling assumption leads to predictions
most in line with the empirical patterns for U.S. imports of automotive parts.
The contribution of our study is threefold. First, we distinguish explicitly be-
tween final goods and intermediates and show how this leads to interdependent
sourcing decisions. Our approach is closest to the incomplete contracting model in
Antra`s (2005) that generates an endogenous production life-cycle.1 Formal contract
enforcement tends to be weaker in less developed countries, making it more difficult
to specify supplier investment and remuneration contractually (Nunn 2007). The
cost advantage of low-wage (South) countries is balanced by a production ineffi-
ciency as the contracting friction leads to underinvestment in specific inputs. Only
when products have matured sufficiently does it become profitable to produce them
in a low-wage location. When we add intermediate products to this model, the
offshoring decisions become interdependent because substituting between interme-
1The property rights model has been a popular framework to study offshoring. Most existing
models assume that decisions are made for each product independently (Antra`s and Helpman, 2004;
Feenstra and Hanson, 2005; Grossman and Helpman, 2005). The model in Spencer and Qiu (2001)
features multiple inputs, but outsourcing decisions are still made for each one individually.
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diates is harder than substituting between final products.2
A few studies have looked at such dependency, relying on mechanisms that are
arguably less relevant in the context of cost-driven offshoring. The need to disclose
sensitive business information or coordinate production decisions introduces a direct
complementarity between outsourcing decisions of different intermediates in Novak
and Stern (2009). The externality is indirect in the model of Acemoglu, Antra`s,
and Helpman (2007) where aggregate output is increasing in the total number of
intermediates, which is interpreted as the level of technology. In the models of
Bartel, Lach, and Sicherman (2005) and Lileeva and Van Biesebroeck (2011) the
interaction is between sourcing decisions of different single-product firms.
The second contribution is to show that the standard neoclassical framework,
where offshoring is driven by technology or cost considerations, can generate the
same endogenous production life-cycle as the incomplete contracting model. If tech-
nology differed across countries, a per-unit offshoring cost would be enough to gener-
ate an interesting model, as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). We assume all
countries use the same technology, but introduce a fixed cost for each intermediate
that is produced in the low-wage location, as in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)
or Nocke and Yeaple (2008). We again find that a product is only offshored after
it has matured sufficiently, when variable cost savings outweigh the additional fixed
cost.
Introducing intermediates in this alternative framework leads to starkly different
predictions. In a model where South production involves a fixed cost, offshoring
is accelerating. Intermediates that mature later, move to the low-cost production
location at an earlier stage of maturity, i.e. when they still require relatively more
high-skill inputs. In contrast, in a model where South production involves incomplete
contracts, the reverse pattern applies in most cases. Offshoring becomes gradually
more difficult. Intermediates that mature later, need to reach a higher level of
maturity before they are profitably produced in the low-cost location.
Our third contribution is to use these models to shed light on the following
patterns in the trade data that are shared by many industries and countries. The top
panel in Figure 1 illustrates that U.S. imports of automotive components from four
Asian countries with emerging auto sectors has risen almost exponentially between
1995 and 2006. The bottom panel illustrates that this growth in value has coincided
with a large increase in the number of different components imported into the United
States.3
2Recent papers by Antra`s and Chor (2010) and Schwarz and Suedekum (2010) also focus on
supply chain choices, but use models with constant cost-savings from offshoring.
3Products are defined at the H.S. 10-digit level. Details on the data and the sample are provided
in Section 4 where we test between two predictions of the two models we develop first.
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Figure 1: U.S. imports of automotive parts from countries with emerging auto sectors
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The attractiveness of foreign sourcing is clearly rising over time, even at an in-
creasing rate. Rising productivity and falling unit costs in foreign sectors are partial
explanations, but unlikely to account for the entire increase. In our model, the de-
cision to import one component from abroad changes the profitability of importing
other components as well. We naturally expect that more sophisticated components
will only be imported at a later time, but it is an open question whether they should
mature less or more than earlier products before sourcing from a low-wage location
becomes profitable. In the automotive sector it is notoriously difficult to substi-
tute between suppliers (Clark and Fujimoto 1991) and the interdependencies in the
model are likely to be important.
To test between the opposing predictions derived from the two modeling assump-
tions, we need information on the order in which parts mature and on the maturity
reached by each part when sourcing switches. A ranking of parts that applies to all
countries is recovered using the method in Feenstra and Rose (2000). As a proxy for
the maturity level of each imported part, we calculate the difference between its im-
port price and the corresponding import prices from a few advanced countries. We
only use this ratio in the first year the United States imports a particular component
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from a country to proxy for the maturity threshold when sourcing switches. Time
and country fixed effects are included in the analysis to control for wage differences.
We find that the patterns in automotive components trade tend to be most sup-
portive of the incomplete contracts assumption, especially for countries with poor
governance according to the World Bank indicators.
The paper is organized along the lines of the three contributions. In Section 2 we
add intermediates to the incomplete contracting model of Antra`s (2005) and illus-
trate the interdependence of sourcing decisions. In Section 3 we show that a much
simpler model with a fixed cost for foreign production also leads to a production
life-cycle, but the interaction of the sourcing decisions with intermediates is starkly
different. In Section 4 we compare the predictive power of both models using data
on U.S. automotive parts imports. Section 5 conclusions with a summary of findings
and with a few broader implications.
2 An incomplete contracting model of outsourcing
2.1 Setup
We first study interdependent sourcing by adding a layer of intermediates into the
model of Antra`s (2005). A firm producing a final good can use a North or South
supplier for each intermediate. Because institutions are less developed in South,
production there suffers from contract incompleteness. Investments in specific inputs
used to produce an intermediate in South are non-verifiable and cannot be contracted
on. Inputs will be chosen noncooperatively and the South supplier and the firm
bargain to split the relationship-specific quasi-rent. This introduces a trade friction,
not present when the intermediate is produced in North where input levels are
contractible.
We follow Antra`s (2005) by assuming an iso-elastic demand for the final product:
R = β−βyβ, β ∈ (0, 1). (1)
R is the sales revenue and β > 0 implies that final products are substitutes.4 The
novelty in our model is that the final good y is produced from several intermediates
yk, with k = 1, ...,K. Rather than deciding the sourcing of the final good directly,
the firm needs to make sourcing decisions for all intermediates.
Production is according to a constant elasticity of substitution technology with
4A love-of-variety Dixit-Stiglitz utility function over varieties can rationalize this demand. We
study only one variety and normalize the constant term to simplify some of the expressions below.
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constant returns to scale:
y =
( K∑
k=1
1
K
yαk
)1/α
, α ≤ β. (2)
Intermediates are indexed by k. α ≤ β implies that it is more difficult for the firm
to substitute between intermediates than it is for consumers to substitute between
final products. Implicitly, this is what defines intermediates. In the short run it
is difficult to change a product’s design and substitute between its components in
production. If α < 0 the intermediates are complements, while for α > 0 they
are substitutes.5 If α = β the difference between intermediates and final product
varieties vanishes and the sourcing pattern in our model becomes identical to that
in Antra`s (2005).
Each intermediate is itself produced with a constant returns to scale Cobb-
Douglas production technology:
yk =
(
xkl
zk
)zk ( xkh
1− zk
)1−zk
. (3)
The high and low-skill inputs xh and xl are interpreted as specific investments.6
The firm chooses xh directly, with each unit produced using one unit of North labor.
It can choose to source xl from a North supplier, in which case it can specify the
level directly and reward the North supplier for its production costs. If it chooses to
source xl from South, the weaker contract environment makes it impossible to specify
contractually the supplier’s investment and remuneration. The South supplier will
choose xl non-cooperatively and bargain with the firm over the ex-post division of
the quasi-rents.
Wages in North are normalized to unity and South wages are strictly lower. The
relative South wage is w ≡ wS/wN < 1. Sourcing an intermediate from South
involves a trade-off between cheaper low-skill inputs and a production inefficiency
due to noncooperative input choices. The low-skill input elasticity zk will play a key
role as the advantage of sourcing intermediate k from South increases with zk.
The international trade literature has used several variations of the property
rights model, see Helpman (2006) for an overview. In the model analyzed in Antra`s
(2005) there are two possible organizational forms in South: (i) an arms-length
relationship between the firm and the South supplier with equal bargaining power
and no secondary markets and (ii) an FDI structure where the South supplier is a
5An extreme case is the Leontief production technology, the limiting case for α → −∞. Inter-
mediates that are close substitutes, e.g. red and blue paint, are aggregated in one intermediate.
6The k index is omitted for xkl and xkh wherever it is obvious.
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subsidiary and the firm still has access to a fraction δ of the low-skill input off the
equilibrium path. Both forms can be nested in a more general bargaining model with
a share m going to the supplier and the balance to the firm (Antra`s and Helpman
2004). To focus on our main contribution, we only consider the case of m = 1/2,
which is equivalent to the arms-length organization in Antra`s (2005).7
In terms of terminology, each final good y is composed of K intermediates yk,
which are themselves produced with two inputs xh and xl. The model has three
stages. First, the firm simultaneously selects suppliers in North or South for each
intermediate. Second, for intermediates sourced in South the firm and supplier
choose input levels simultaneously and noncooperatively. For intermediates sourced
in North the firm chooses both input levels. Assembly can simply be thought of as
one intermediate. Third, production takes place and the firm chooses a price to sell
the final product in a monopolistically competitive market.
2.2 Firm behavior
The model is solved backwards as follows. In the third stage, past input choices
determine the output of all intermediates and the final product. Given the assump-
tions of monopolistic competition and CES demand, the optimal price is a constant
markup over marginal cost. In the second stage, input levels are chosen while taking
the impact on outputs of all intermediates and the slope of final product demand
into account. This choice is taken differently for intermediates sourced in North or
South. In the first stage, the firm selects the sourcing configuration, i.e. one location
for each intermediate, that maximizes its profits over all possible configurations.
(a) North suppliers
For North suppliers contracts are complete and inputs xh and xl can be considered
as chosen directly by the firm that produces the final product to maximize its profit.
The first order condition for each input equalizes its marginal revenue product to
the marginal cost:
∂R
∂y
· ∂y
∂yk
· ∂yk
∂xi
= wN ≡ 1, i = h, l.
Dividing the two first order conditions reveals that the firm will always produce at
a point where
xl
z
=
xh
1− z , (4)
7The second organizational form amounts to m = (1− δσ)(1− η), with η the bargaining weight
of the supplier and σ the elasticity of substitution across products. With α = β it equals 1/(1−β),
but with α < β it is a more complicated function of the β and α parameters.
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and the production cost is constant at cNk = 1 (= ACN = MCN ). Equation (4)
determines the input mix for the two inputs, while the absolute input levels are
determined by equating the marginal revenue contribution of intermediate k to its
marginal cost:
∂R
∂y
∂y
∂yk
= cNk ≡ 1. (5)
This condition will be taken into account when determining the optimal price of the
final good, which pins down the optimal quantity and implicitly also the output of
all intermediates.
(b) South suppliers
For South suppliers contracts are incomplete and the firm and its supplier will choose
inputs noncooperatively. Payoffs are determined in an ex-post bargaining game
over the surplus generated with the specific inputs with both parties assigned equal
bargaining strength. For the supplier, we use the standard assumption that there
are no secondary markets for its input, which puts its outside option to zero.
To facilitate the exposition, we assume that the firm has the option of using
a generic intermediate k. It is never used in equilibrium, but if it were the sales
revenue net of the cost of the generic intermediate R′ would be independent of the
specific inputs xkl and xkh. The difference between R and R′ is positive and equals
the quasi-rent from this one bilateral relationship. Introducing R′ leaves the rent
associated with other intermediates outside the bargaining with the supplier of k.8
The Nash bargaining solution is obtained if the firm and supplier choose inputs
to maximize the following profits:
Firm: max
xh
1
2(R−R′) +R′ −
∑
l 6=k cj − wNxh
Supplier: max
xl
1
2(R−R′)− wSxl
Noncooperative choices of xh and xl lead to the following first order conditions:
1
2
∂R
∂y
∂y
∂yk
∂yk
∂xh
= wN
1
2
∂R
∂y
∂y
∂yk
∂yk
∂xl
= wS .
Dividing the two illustrates that the optimal input mix still equates the relative
8Note that introducing R′ has no effect on the equilibrium. In the absence of generic interme-
diates, the ex-ante payment would simply adjust to reflect the greater bargaining strength of the
supplier. Either way, the South supplier will earn its reservation wage in equilibrium.
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productivities to the relative wage:
xSl /z
xNh /(1− z)
=
wS
wN
≡ w. (6)
Optimal pricing and output is again determined by the demand function and the
first order conditions for all k, which for a South-sourced intermediate equals
1
2
∂R
∂y
∂y
∂yk
= wzkS w
1−zk
N ≡ cSk . (7)
With incomplete contracts, the firm and supplier choose input levels below first best
as they bear the full cost but only receive one half of the proceeds. Underinvestment
drives a wedge between the marginal revenue product of intermediate k and the
(efficient) marginal production cost. With equal bargaining weight, only one half
of the marginal revenue is taken into account and output will be inefficiently low.
From the final good producer’s point of view the relevant marginal cost of procuring
input k in South is twice the production cost:
MCSk = 2c
S
k .
Only when zk is sufficiently high will marginal procurement costs for intermediate
k be lower in South.
An additional benefit of South sourcing is the lump sum transfer that the firm
receives when it selects a South supplier. This payment accomplishes that in equi-
librium South suppliers receive their reservation wage wS for all low-skill inputs they
provide and all ex-post rents accrue to the firm (Helpman, 2006). If the input mix
is undistorted, which will be the case with equal bargaining strengths, the average
cost of sourcing intermediate k from South will equal the production cost
ACSk = (xh + wxl)/yk ≡ cSk =
1
2
MCSk .
The marginal cost exceeds the average by a factor of two and the difference con-
tributes to profits.9
9Unequal bargaining strength for the firm and the supplier, indicated by 1 −m and m, would
lead to a number of differences: (i) The relative productivities are equalized to w(1 −m)/m and
the input-mix is distorted as the firm and supplier underinvest to different extents. (ii) Actual
production costs differ from cSk = w
zk . (iii) MCk exceeds the efficient production cost c
S
k by a
factor [(1−m)1−zkmzk ]−1 (iv) ACk is lower than MCk by a factor [(1−m)(1− zk) +mzk], which
can be higher or lower than the efficient production cost cSk . (v) The implicit markup over the
procurement cost depends on the maturity of South-sourced intermediate, rather than equalling
(1/β) (see below). For m < 1/2, the equilibrium markup rises with maturity. The low bargaining
weight of the supplier makes its underinvestment ever more costly and production increasingly
inefficient as the part matures. The firm prefers to extract more profit per output rather than
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(c) Firm (final good producer)
Conditional on the sourcing decision for each part, equation (4) or (6) determines
the optimal input mix and equation (5) or (7) determines the absolute input levels.
Moreover, the output level of intermediate k depends on the sourcing pattern of all
other intermediates. Substituting the derivatives of the CES demand expression (1)
and the production function (2) in the first order conditions we can write
yk = β
(
K · M˜C
)− 1
1−β
(
MCk
M˜C
)− 1
1−α
. (8)
M˜C averages the procurement cost of all intermediates as a CES price index:
M˜C
− α
1−α = 1K
∑K
l=1MC
− α
1−α
l , where MCN or MC
S
l as defined in the two previous
sections is used depending on the sourcing of each intermediate l.
The optimal output of intermediate k is naturally declining in MCk. With α < β
it is also declining in the marginal cost of other inputs (cross-cost effect). Even
though an increase in MCl leads to substitution towards intermediate k in the
production of the final good, this effect is outweighed by the lower sales of the final
product as the cost increase raises the final product price. The substitution effect
away from the final good that contains both intermediates k and l dominates the
substitution between k and l. Stronger substitution between intermediates (α closer
to β) strengthens the own-cost effect, but diminishes the cross-cost effect.
Given the CES demand assumption and monopolistic competition in the final
good market, optimal price setting for the final product will be p∗ = MC/β and
total variable profits are (1 − β)R. The marginal cost of the final product equals
(
∑
kMCkyk)/y. Through MCk it depends directly on the sourcing decisions of all
intermediates (North or South) and there is an additional indirect effect through
the relative importance of each input (yk/y). A specific feature of the incomplete
contracting model is that the ex-ante payments from South suppliers also contribute
to profits. They equal the difference between the marginal and average procurement
cost for an intermediate sourced in South.
Combining both contributions, we obtain
pi = p y −
∑
k
ACk yk
= (1− β)R+
∑
s∈S
(MCs −ACs)ys
increase output. The underproduction of yk is proportional to the deviation of m
z(1−m)1−z from
unity, making it optimal eventually to give more bargaining power to the supplier. The option of
first producing in South using FDI and switching to an arms-length sourcing relationship for more
mature intermediates in Antra`s (2005) accomplishes just this.
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=
∑
n∈N
(1− β) MCn yn/β +
∑
s∈S
(MCs − βACs) ys/β.
Substituting in the definitions for the average costs and the output level of interme-
diates, and using nS to indicate the number of South-sourced intermediates gives
optimal profits in the incomplete contracting case as
pi =
(
(1− β)(K − nS) + (1− β2 )
∑
s∈S
MC
− α
1−α
s
)
×
(
M˜C
) β−α
α(1−β)
. (9)
We can divide the first term by M˜C
− α
1−α such that it is a weighted average of the two
price-cost markups. The second expression then amounts to total revenue, which
can be seen by substituting the definition of yk in
∑
kMCkyk/β.
2.3 Equilibrium
Conditional on the maturities of all intermediates, a 1 ×K vector of zk values, we
can evaluate the above profit expression for each possible sourcing configuration.
The sourcing equilibrium chosen by the firm in the first stage of the model is simply
the one yielding the highest profits out of the 2K possible configurations.
Among the different sourcing configurations with nS intermediates in South, it
is profit maximizing to source the nS intermediates with the highest z indices in
South.10 The optimal sourcing configuration conditional on the vector of maturities
can then simply be characterized by n∗S , the number of intermediates sourced in
South. It will satisfy the following condition:
pi(n∗S) ≥ pi(j) for all j ∈ {1, ...,K}.
n∗S can be found by evaluating profits only for the K relevant configurations, always
sourcing the j intermediates with highest z values in South.
2.4 All possible equilibria in the two-intermediate case
Now that we know how to find the sourcing equilibrium for any vector of maturities,
we want to characterize how the equilibrium configurations vary with maturity lev-
els. In particular, we want to study how the sourcing decision of one intermediate
depends on the sourcing of other intermediates. In the next section we demonstrate
a few general properties. To provide intuition, we first illustrate graphically the
10We show in Appendix A.2 that the derivative of profits with respect to the maturity z of an
intermediate sourced in South is positive, while it does not vary with the maturity of parts sourced
in North.
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Figure 2: All sourcing equilibria in the two-intermediate case with incomplete con-
tracts
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Note: the lines partition the space into four areas with different optimal sourcing configu-
rations for different values of α. They refer, in order of the vertical segments, to α = −8
(blue), α = 0.1 (red), α = 0.65 (yellow), and α = β = 0.8 (black straight lines).
equilibria for all possible maturity vectors when there are only two intermediates.
For each element in (z1, z2) space, we compare profits in the three possible sourc-
ing configurations, n∗S = 0, 1, or 2, where the intermediate with highest z is sourced
in South if n∗S = 1. In Figure 2 the space is partitioned into four areas. When the
two intermediates have similar maturities, they will most of the time be sourced in
the same location. The low maturities at the bottom-left lead to (N,N) sourcing and
the top-right area represents (S,S) equilibria. In the bottom-right and top-left areas
only the intermediate with the highest z value is sourced in South and the other in
North.
The colored borders between the areas indicate maturity thresholds (z∗k) where
the firm is indifferent between different sourcing configurations. Lines with different
colors are for different values of the α parameter, the ease of substitution between
intermediates.
In the extreme case of α = β, the equilibrium is always the same as in Antra`s
(2005). When the sourcing of the first intermediate changes, there is no effect on
the derived demand for the second intermediate. Substitution by the firm between
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different intermediates of the same final product is exactly offset by substitution
between different final products by consumers. As a result, optimal sourcing for
each part is independent of the maturity or sourcing location of the other part.11
The threshold maturity values that make the firm indifferent between sourcing a
part in North or South are the black straight lines; z∗1 and z∗2 both equal the same
constant.12
Figure 3: Maturity threshold and costs in the incomplete contracting case
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When α < β this independence is still present when the firm considers sourcing a
first part in South. The maturity thresholds between the (N,N) area and the (N,S)
or (S,N) areas do not depend on the maturity of the other part which is sourced in
North. Note, however, that each vertical segment for part 1 is shifted to the left of
the black line for the α = β benchmark case. The first intermediate is offshored at a
lower maturity level than would be the case for independent products. We explain
this at some length because it provides an important insight into the mechanics of
the model (affecting all sourcing decisions).
The thought experiment in Figure 2 is to raise z1 along a horizontal line holding
z2 constant at a low level. When z1 crosses the z∗1 threshold, production of interme-
diate 1 switches from North to South and the procurement cost to the firm changes
from MCN1 = 1 to MC
S
1 = 2w
z1 . At the same time, the implicit markup on the
intermediate rises from (1−β) to (1−β/2). Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of costs
as a function of a part’s maturity and sourcing location. By definition, to the right
11The independence can be seen directly from the optimal output yk in equation (8) which only
depends on ck in this case, not on c˜. Intermediates and final goods are now indistinguishable and
the CES model leads to independent pricing in the final good market.
12In Antra`s’ model, South production by a subsidiary is a third sourcing option. It involves less
underinvestment in the high-skill input and will be optimal for goods with intermediate maturity
levels. Hence, there are two, constant maturity thresholds.
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of the z∗ threshold the advantages of South production dominate the production
inefficiency.13
The firm can only be indifferent between sourcing an intermediate in North or
South if the higher markup in South is compensated for by a higher procurement
cost. Hence, it must be the case that MCS(z∗) = 2cS > cN and the marginal
procurement cost of the intermediate rises when sourcing switches from North to
South. Immediately after a switch the firm will substitute away from the inter-
mediate. However, although ex-post procurement costs are higher in South, total
profitability including the ex-ante payment is higher. The greater difficulty of sub-
stituting away from South-sourced parts leads to a larger quasi-rent for these parts
than in the case without interdependent demand. It encourages both the supplier
and the firm to invest more in the production of South-sourced parts, making them
already profitable at lower maturity levels.14
While α < β facilitates offshoring of the first part, it makes it more difficult to
offshore all parts. The entire (S,S) area lies in a subset of the top-right quadrant
defined by the benchmark black lines. South production of the second part happens
unambiguously at a more mature stage than it would for independent goods. There
is a delay before sourcing of the second part switches to South as the maturity of the
first part has to mature sufficiently for its marginal procurement cost in South to fall
below its original marginal cost in North. This delaying effect is more pronounced
for lower values of α.
Because of this delay, the two areas discussed thus far, (N,N) and (S,S), do not
touch. There is an intermediate range of z values where the intermediate with the
highest value is produced in South and the second intermediate in North. The z∗
threshold has an upward sloping section that coincides with the 45 degree line and
separates the (N; S) and (S; N) areas.15
The section of the z∗1 threshold that separates the (N,S) and (S,S) areas at the top
is a function of the maturity of the second part which is already produced in South
and of the ease of substitution between the parts. For a given z2 it is more difficult to
offshore part 1 the lower is α. Better substitutes lowers the derived demand for part
13The elasticity of the final good demand and the production function will influence the trade-off,
as well as the maturity levels of other parts already produced in South.
14Another way to see this is through the relative impact on intermediates. The equilibrium
price for the final product rises after a switch and consumers will substitute away from it. If α = β,
substitution by the firm and consumers balance out leaving demand for North-sourced intermediates
unaffected. To find the maturity threshold, the firm only needs to equate the markup gain and cost
increase for the affected part. If α < β, the consumer’s substitution dominates and the lower output
for other intermediates raises the share of the switched part in profit. Because the profit margin is
greater for South-sourced part, the lower α parameter increases profits with South sourcing.
15The segment is found by equating pi(S,N) = pi(N,S) using the profit expression in equation
(9) and solving for the z∗1 threshold. Because the two z values enter symmetrically on either side,
the equation has a unique solution at z∗1(z2) = z2.
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1 which makes it easier to overcome its temporary increase in marginal procurement
cost when it moves to South.
For a given α, the sign of ∂z∗1/∂z2 depends on the sign of α. If α > 0 and the two
parts are substitutes (yellow line), the threshold slopes away from the black line.
Higher maturity of part 2 makes it more difficult to offshore part 1. This is because
the substitution away from part 1 is not sufficient to overcome the higher demand
for part 1 induced by the lower cost of the final good when z2 is higher. In contrast,
if α < 0 and intermediates are complements (blue line) offshoring part 1 becomes
easier for a higher z2. The cost share for the expensive part 1 is is increasing in z2
and thus final demand and derived demand for part 1 is decreasing in z2.
2.5 A dynamic interpretation
We derived the optimal sourcing configuration conditional on a vector of maturities
and then we discussed how the equilibrium configuration varies over the (z1, z2)
space and how it depends on the α parameter. Now, we characterize how the
sourcing equilibrium evolves when maturities evolve. In a dynamic interpretation, it
is intuitive to view successive z-vectors as weakly-increasing and we derive a number
of properties for the successive sourcing equilibria.
The first result holds all K − 1 maturities constant and traces the sourcing equi-
libria when only zk varies.
Proposition 1 Given the skill intensity of all other parts, there exists a z∗k threshold
such that part k should be produced in North if zk < z∗k and in South if zk ≥ z∗k, with
South production involving incomplete contracts.
This result generalizes the equilibrium in Antra`s (2005) to the case with interdepen-
dent intermediates. The key step in the proof is to show that ∂pi(k ∈ S)/∂zk > 0
while ∂pi(k ∈ N)/∂zk = 0, holding the sourcing of other parts fixed. Hence, as
zk rises, profits with k in South will at some point dominate. The possibility of
changing the sourcing of other parts can never overturn this result. Details are in
the Appendix.
Note that the thresholds in Proposition 1 are functions of the maturities of other
parts. It is possible that after sourcing of intermediate k has optimally moved to
South at a particular zk > z∗k value, a sufficient increase in maturity of another
part might change the optimal sourcing of intermediate k back to North. This can
happen when another part passes k in terms of maturity and they switch sourcing
locations. When parts are substitutes, it is even possible that an increase in the
maturity of the most mature part forces optimal sourcing of another (less-mature)
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South-sourced part back to North.16
A second result establishes that
Corollary 2 With incomplete contracts in South, it is never optimal to switch two
or more parts to South simultaneously, even when they are of the same skill intensity.
There does not exist any maturity vector such that the firm is indifferent between
pi(n∗S) and pi(n
∗
S + 2). If this were true, a small increase in one part’s maturity could
lead to an increase of the number of parts sourced in South by more than one. The
proof is also in the Appendix.
Taken together, these results indicate that the succession of equilibria imply a
product-life cycle for each intermediate: parts with low z levels are produced in
North, while mature parts are offshored. As zk increases, at some point it crosses
a threshold and production of part k switches from North to South. Moreover, the
optimal sourcing of other parts might change as a result. A North to South switch by
part k cannot trigger North to South sourcing changes for other parts with constant
maturity, but a sufficiently large increase in the maturity of a South-sourced part
might induce a North to South switch for a complementary part. An increase in zk
might lead to a South to North sourcing change for other (constant) intermediates
if k moves up in the part ordering or if parts are substitutes.
A third result establishes that the maturity thresholds for successive interme-
diates are increasing for parts that are substitutes, suggesting that the offshoring
process is slowing down. For such a characterization to have a clear interpreta-
tion, intermediates must be unambiguously ranked by maturity. We assume that
the high-skill input intensity of intermediates is increasing in the order k, i.e. at
all times z1 ≥ z2 ≥ ... ≥ zK , without any restriction on the differences between
subsequent z’s. Lower ranked intermediates start maturing sooner and reach any
specific z value before higher ranked intermediates. Higher ranked intermediates
might catch up, but they can never surpass them.
We already established that intermediates will switch from North to South one
by one in the order of the k ranking. The main question is then, how does the
interdependence of sourcing decisions influences the maturity threshold at which
parts are offshored?
We already discussed in the two-intermediate case of Figure 2 that the first
part is offshored at a lower maturity threshold with interdependence, compared
to the independent sourcing case. This generalizes to the case of K intermediates.
16This can be seen in Figure 2 as the yellow threshold separating the (S,N) and (S,S) areas is
upward-sloping. A sufficient increase in z1 can change the optimal sourcing location of part 2 from
South back to to North (holding z2 constant).
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Additional parts produced in North do not affect the sourcing decision of the first
part. The offshoring process thus gets started more easily if the trade friction takes
the form of an incomplete contract in South countries. But once the process has
started, how quickly does it spread to successive parts?
With only two intermediates, the second intermediate switches to South pro-
duction at a higher level of maturity than intermediate 1. In the area below the
45-degree line, where the maturity ranking is constant, z∗1 < z∗2 in Figure 2. Com-
paring the thresholds for subsequent intermediates is more complicated if K > 2 as
they depend on the maturity levels of all parts already produced in South. It is even
possible that intermediate k switches sourcing without a change in its own zk index.
When intermediates are substitutes, we can still establish the following general
result.
Proposition 3 If production in South involves incomplete contracts and zk ≥ zk+1
for all k, the sourcing thresholds that make the firm indifferent between North and
South sourcing of intermediates k and k + 1 satisfy z∗k < z
∗
k+1 if α > 0.
The proof is in the Appendix and we also illustrate there why the result does not
extend to the case of α < 0.
The intuition is as follows. After an initial dip in output when an additional
part switches to South, output is generally increasing in the maturity of parts in
South. The z∗k+1 threshold will be crossed at a higher output level than threshold z
∗
k
was. At this higher output level, switching sourcing of an additional part to South
is more difficult because its marginal cost rises temporarily after the switch. It will
thus require a higher maturity level until it is profitable.
If parts are substitutes this holds generally. If parts are complements, an alterna-
tive pattern is possible in extreme circumstances. If the maturity of South-sourced
parts rises sufficiently between the offshoring of part k and k + 1, it can raise the
total quasi-rent that part k + 1 can hold-up so much that it is optimally offshored
already at a maturity threshold lower than z∗k. This can only happen if the firm is
unable to substitute away from the more expensive parts and if the average matu-
rity of inframarginal parts rises very much. It does make Proposition 3 only hold in
general for α > 0.
These effects can be quantitatively important. The z threshold to offshore the
first part in Figure 2 was 0.145 (for α = 0.1), while the second part was never
offshored before its maturity reached 0.22. The difference between the two thresholds
is even larger for lower values of α and for higher α values the z∗2 threshold is
increasing in the maturity of the South-sourced part 1.
Figure 4 illustrates the prediction of Proposition 3 when there are many parts. It
16
Figure 4: Sourcing thresholds in the incomplete contracting case
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plots the optimal sourcing thresholds for successive parts for a particular assumption
on the evolution of the z indices.17 Each successive point corresponds to a maturity
vector where the firm is indifferent between sourcing one additional intermediate in
South. The maturity level of that marginal intermediate is indicated on the vertical
axis. The lines connect the equilibria for different values of the α parameter which
governs the substitutability of parts. We used a sequential maturing of parts—z1
goes from 0 to 1 before any other part starts maturing, followed by z2 going all the
way from 0 to 1 before the remaining parts mature, etc.
The horizontal grey line is for α = β = 0.8, in which case sourcing of all intermedi-
ates is decided independently and the thresholds are the same for all intermediates—
cfr. the black straight lines in Figure 2. For lower α’s, successive thresholds are
always higher indicating a slow-down in outsourcing. Higher ranked parts need to
mature further before they can be profitably produced in South. The pattern was
the same for other modeling choices that we tried for the maturity progression, e.g.
linear maturing with higher ranked intermediates starting with a constant advance
and concave rate of maturing where parts are converging in maturity.
To verify that Proposition 3 does not extend to the case of α < 0, we included
a case with maturity bursts that extend to several parts, but not all. Because the
thresholds are a declining function of z˜S , the maturity of parts already produced in
South, a large enough increase in z˜S between parts k and k+ 1 can induce a drop in
the maturity threshold, i.e. acceleration in offshoring. This possibility is indicated
17We used the following parameter values: K = 10, β = 0.8, w = 0.1.
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with the dashed grey line in Figure 4.18
3 An alternative model of outsourcing: South produc-
tion involves a fixed cost
3.1 The model
The incomplete contracting approach in the previous section has three disadvan-
tages. The model is relatively complicated. It leads to inconclusive predictions
for the relative sourcing thresholds if parts are complements. When parts are sub-
stitutes, offshoring is predicted to require ever greater maturity, i.e. become more
difficult, which seems counterintuitive in light of the observed patterns in Figure 1.
The lower wage in South provides an incentive to produce low-skilled inputs
there. Without trade frictions all xl would be produced in South if z > 0, making
the problem uninteresting. Even a trade friction that is proportional to the variable
production cost would lead to an uninteresting problem, as sourcing decisions of
all intermediates would be independent events.19 A simple alternative would be to
introduce a fixed cost f for each part that is produced in South.
3.2 Firm behavior
Conditional on the sourcing decisions of all intermediates much of the mechanics of
the model are the same as before. The optimal input mix follows equation (4) for
intermediates sourced in North and equation (6) for South parts, equating marginal
products to the appropriate relative wage.
Equilibrium output is obtained by equating the marginal revenue product for
each intermediate ∂R/∂yk to the relevant marginal production cost cNk or c
S
k . This
is decided centrally by the North firm as it determines quantity and price for the final
good, conditional on the sourcing pattern of all intermediates. For parts sourced
in North the input levels are determined by equation (5), while for South parts the
adjustment for the incomplete contracting friction disappears and the first order
18This sequence is generated for α = −10 and assuming the following evolution for the z indices.
The first five intermediates mature gradually together, which leads to the usual deceleration. They
mature completely to z = 1 before z6 > 0. As a result, part 6 faces a much higher z˜S than part 5
did, which induces a temporary acceleration, i.e. z∗6 < z
∗
5 . As this is only possible if the difference
in z˜S is sufficiently large, the parts following 6 will again show deceleration.
19Iceberg transportation costs or tariffs would lead to a landed marginal cost for intermediate k
that is produced in South equal to cSk = w
zk/θ (0 < θ < 1), while the marginal cost of producing
yk in North is always unity. Any intermediate with zk > ln(θ/w) would be produced in South
irrespective of where other intermediates are produced. In general equilibrium, a non-tradables
sector could fix the relative South wage rate and make the ln(θ/w) threshold a constant.
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Figure 5: Maturity threshold and costs when South production entails fixed costs
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condition becomes the same equation with the right hand side set to cSk = w
zk .
The evolution of marginal costs in North and South and the maturity threshold
where sourcing switches for a representative intermediate k are illustrated in Figure
5.
For a representative intermediate, Figure 5 illustrates that marginal production
and thus also procurement costs are lower when the part is sourced in South. cSk
is always below the constant marginal cost of North production, but only when the
gap is sufficient to cover the fixed cost will production take place in South, i.e. when
the average cost of production is lower in South. In addition to the fixed cost f ,
the z∗ threshold is also a function of the optimal output levels under either sourcing
mode yNk (z
∗) and ySk (z
∗), which depend themselves on all parameters in the model,
in particular the maturity levels of all parts already produced in South.
Pricing for the final good is unchanged and profits can be derived in the same
way as before as
pi(c˜, nS) = (1− β) (Kc˜)−
β
1−β − f · nS . (10)
Profit depends on nS , the number of intermediates produced in South, as South
production raises fixed costs. It also depends on the average cost c˜ which is defined
similarly as the M˜C aggregate before: c˜−
α
1−α = 1K
∑K
l=1 c
− α
1−α
l .
The profit equation nicely illustrates the different roles of the β and α param-
eters. If all intermediates are produced in North, c˜ = 1 and the z parameters are
irrelevant. Optimal quantities and price are determined solely by the number of
intermediates and the substitutability of final products. This is because output in
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the CES production function rises with K and because the equilibrium price-cost
ratio equals 1/β. When at least one intermediate is sourced from South, the av-
erage marginal production cost declines (c˜ < 1), equilibrium output is raised, and
variable profits rise. The c˜ average is declining in the z index of a South-sourced
intermediate, but the α parameter also plays a role now.
Implicitly, profit vary with z˜, which is defined as c˜ = wz˜, mirroring cSk = w
zk .
It is the appropriately weighted average maturity of parts and determines variable
cost savings from South production. It differs from the simple unweighted average
z¯ for two reasons. First, for components sourced in North the z value used in the
c˜ average is 0 because North production cost always remains at wN = w0 = 1.
Second, the relative weight of intermediates depends on α, which determines the
substitution elasticity in production. If α > 0, intermediates are substitutes and
z˜ will be higher than the unweighted average. Substitution towards South-sourced
intermediates with high z raises their weight in the marginal cost of the final good
and their z’s will receive a higher weight in the z˜ aggregate as well. This effect is
stronger if substitution between intermediates is easier (larger α). If α < 0 and
intermediates are complements, the cost share of intermediates from North will be
more than proportional and z˜ will be lower than the unweighted average.
Comparing profit equation (10) to the one for the incomplete contracting model,
in equation (9), reveals three differences.20
First, there are the explicit fixed costs associated with South production.
Second, the firm now considers the production costs cs rather than the procure-
ment costs MCs for intermediates produced in South. Without rent sharing and
inefficient (noncooperative) input choices, the costs considered by the firm to de-
termine y∗ are the lower production costs, rather than its own expenditures, i.e.
wNxh and the fraction of the rent shared with the South supplier in the incomplete
contracts case.
Third, in the current case the implicit markup on the cost of intermediates is a
uniform (1 − β). In the incomplete contracting place, this multiplier only applies
to intermediates produced in North, with a higher markup (1 − β/2) applied to
intermediates sourced in South. These come from the ex-ante payment for these in-
termediates that raises profits and show up as a higher equilibrium markup. Without
a fraction of the profits received ex ante, the firm’s profits are now more responsive
20To facilitate comparison, we re-write equation (10) in the same form as (9):
pi = g(K)
(
(1− β)(K − nS) + (1− β)
∑
s∈S
c
− α1−α
s
)
× (c˜)
β−α
α(1−β) − f · nS .
20
to price increases and the equilibrium price markup will be lower.
3.3 Equilibrium
Conditional on the vector of maturities of all intermediates, the sourcing equilibrium
is again found by comparing profits under all possible configurations. As in the
incomplete contracting model, it is again optimal to offshore intermediates in the
order of their maturity, indexed by k. The equilibrium can again be characterized
by the number of intermediates sourced in South.
The first term in the profit equation (10), the variable profit, is monotonically
decreasing in c˜, which is itself a decreasing function of nS . Variable profits are
thus increasing in nS , which is intuitive. The second term in (10), the sum of fixed
costs, increases linearly in nS . In equilibrium, intermediates will be offshored until
the variable cost savings are outweighed by the additional fixed cost. For any two
sourcing configurations, there is an implicit threshold for the change in marginal
cost c˜ that makes the firm indifferent between the two configurations. The profit
comparison boils down to
c˜(nS)
− β
1−β − c˜(n′S)−
β
1−β = ∆nS f K
β
1−β
1−β , (11)
As before, we need to evaluate profits for all possible nS ∈ {1, ...,K} to find the
optimum. We illustrate in the next section that it is important to also compare
sourcing configurations that differ by more than one part, e.g. nk and nk+2.
3.4 All possible equilibria in the two-intermediate case
For a final good that is made up of only two intermediates, we again illustrate
graphically the sourcing equilibria for all points in (z1, z2) space. The two maturity
thresholds z∗1(z2) and z∗2(z1) partition the space into four sourcing configurations
which is illustrated for different values of α in Figure 6.
The special case of independent intermediates, α = β, is represented by the
black straight lines. Both thresholds are independent of the maturity level of the
other part. The contribution to profit of each intermediate is additive. Comparing
alternative sourcing options for intermediate 1 in equation (11), the contribution
of intermediate 2 cancels out on the left-hand side. In this case, the equilibrium
from the much simpler model with fixed costs takes the exact same form as in the
incomplete contracting model which was first analyzed by Antra`s (2005).
If α < β, the threshold z∗1(z2) at which the firm is indifferent to source interme-
diate 1 from North or South is a weakly decreasing function of the maturity level
of the second intermediate. Equation (11) pins down the maturity threshold z∗1 for
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Figure 6: All sourcing equilibria in the two-intermediate case with fixed costs
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Note: The lines are the maturity thresholds that partition the space into four optimal
sourcing configurations for different values of α. In the order of the vertical segments, they
refer to α = β = 0.8 (black straight lines), α = 0.65 (yellow), α = 0.1 (red), α = −5 (blue).
each value of z2 and the slope of this function depends on the sourcing location of
intermediate 2, which can take three forms:
Intermediate 2 in North [cS1 (z
∗
1)
α˜ + (cN2 )
α˜]β˜/α˜ − [(cN1 )α˜ + (cN2 )α˜]β˜/α˜ = f K˜ (12)
Intermediate 2 in South [cS1 (z
∗
1)
α˜ + (cS2 (z2))
α˜]β˜/α˜ − [(cN1 )α˜ + (cS2 (z2))α˜]β˜/α˜ = f K˜ (13)
Simultaneous switch [cS1 (z
∗
1)
α˜ + (cS2 (z2))
α˜]β˜/α˜ − [(cN1 )α˜ + (cN2 )α˜]β˜/α˜ = 2 f K˜ (14)
The exponents are α˜ = −α/(1 − α), β˜ = −β/(1 − β), and K˜ = 2−β˜/(1 − β) is
a scaling term. Each of the equations (12)-(14) corresponds to a segment of the
downward-sloping line that defines the z∗1 threshold in Figure 6. The three segments
of the z∗1 threshold in Figure 2 for the incomplete contracting case can be defined
similarly, but the algebra is more involved.
Equation (12) determines the border between the (N,N) and (S,N) areas. The
maturity of intermediate 2 is irrelevant as its marginal cost is constant, leading to a
vertical segment. The left-hand side increases monotonically in z1 as cS1 falls from
1 to w. The equation has a unique solution for z∗1 if the maximum LHS at z1 = 1
exceeds K˜f .
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In equation (13) the second intermediate is already produced in South and cN2 is
twice replaced with the lower cost cS2 (z2). The threshold z
∗
1 has to be lower than
in the previous case and sourcing for intermediate 1 will already be profitable in
South at a smaller marginal cost advantage.21 With intermediate 2 in South the
total marginal cost of the final good is lower and equilibrium output higher. As
long as α < β substitution away from the relatively more expensive intermediate 1
will not be strong enough to overturn the higher derived demand for intermediate
1. At a higher production volume y∗1 it is easier to recover the fixed costs of South
sourcing, which thus happens at lower z∗1 .
Moreover, the z∗1 threshold depends directly on z2. Applying the implicit function
theorem to equation (13) demonstrates that ∂z∗1(z2)/∂z2 < 0. The mechanism
leading to a lower z∗1 if intermediate 2 is produced in South is reinforced with higher
z2. The border separating the (N,S) and (S,S) areas thus lays to the left of the
vertical segment and is downward-sloping.
Finally, equation (14) determines the segment in the middle that separates the
(N,N) and (S,S) areas. When the maturities of the intermediates are sufficiently
similar, i.e. near the 45-degree line, it will be optimal to produce both intermediates
in South at a maturity level where neither of the intermediates can alone be prof-
itably produced in South. The output boost from switching one intermediate from
North to South makes it profitable to make the same sourcing switch for the second
component.
The reason is that variable profits are convexly increasing in z˜, while sourcing an
additional intermediate in South only raises fixed costs by a constant amount. If a
second intermediate is almost as mature as the first one, it is very well possible that
c˜(2)β˜ − 1 exceeds 2fK˜ before c˜(1)β˜ − 1 exceeds fK˜.22
The lines in Figure 6 partition the space into four areas with a different optimal
sourcing configuration. Differently colored lines correspond to different values of the
α parameter, which governs the substitutability of intermediates, holding constant
the β parameter, which governs the substitutability of final products.
The maturity threshold to offshore the first component is higher if α is low.
Moving production of one intermediate to South has a smaller effect on profits if α
21If α > 0, α˜ < 0 and all (cS)α˜ terms are larger than one. β > α further implies that β˜/α˜ > 1
and the first term in equation (13) has to be lower than the corresponding term in (12) for the left
hand sides of both equations to equalize. With α˜ < 0 this happens if z∗1 is lower. If α < 0, the
(cS)α˜ terms are smaller than one, but the exponent β˜/α˜ turns negative. The first term in equation
(13) now has to be greater than the corresponding term in (12), but this again means a lower z∗1 .
22In the general case with K intermediates, even more simultaneous switches are possible if z
values for more parts are similar as well. In the incomplete contracting model, the equivalent of
equation (14) does not have an interior solution, as demonstrated in Proposition 2. Instead, there is
an ‘invert sourcing’ segment where the firm is indifferent between the sourcing configurations (S,N)
and (N,S). This equation does not have a solution in the model with fixed costs.
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is low because the firm cannot substitute as easily away from the expensive North-
sourced intermediate as consumers can substitute between final goods. Output will
not rise very much, making it harder to recover fixed costs and offshoring will only
start at higher maturity levels.
The same difficulty to substitute away from the expensive intermediate raises its
derived demand when another intermediate is already produced in South. This now
has the opposite effect, making it easier to recover the fixed cost of offshoring an
additional intermediate. This effect only goes so far, as for α < 0 intermediates are
complements and the cost of the final good rises and its quantity falls introducing
an opposing effect. The segment of the z∗2 threshold separating the (S,N) and (S,S)
areas is lowest for α close to zero. In any case, the second intermediate is offshored
at a lower maturity level than the first, an acceleration in the offshoring process.
In sum, the difficulty of substituting between intermediates (low α) works as a
complementarity. It increases the incentive to produce intermediates in the same
place. The first effect is to delay offshoring of the first intermediate. The second
effect is to accelerate offshoring of part 2 when part 1 is already produced in South.
The third effect is to enlarge the segment of the threshold that separates the (N,N)
and (S,S) areas.
3.5 A dynamic interpretation
We now adopt the same dynamic interpretation as before, i.e. we characterize how
the the sourcing configuration changes when maturities increase. First holding the
maturities of all other intermediates constant, the maturing of one intermediate also
leads to a production life-cycle in the model with fixed costs:
Proposition 4 Given the skill intensity of all other parts, there exists a z∗k threshold
such that part k should be produced in North if zk < z∗k and in South if zk ≥ z∗k, with
South production incurring a fixed cost.
The equilibrium sourcing pattern satisfies the following property which was not
the case for the incomplete contracting model:
Corollary 5 Once a part is sourced from South, no increase in the skill intensity
of other parts will be able to switch optimal production of the part back to North.
Proofs for both results are in the Appendix. Proposition 4 follows just like Propo-
sition 1 from the slope of the profit derivative: ∂pi(k ∈ S)/∂zk > 0. Corollary 5
follows from the key property that ∂2pi(k ∈ S)/∂zk∂c˜ < 0. Both derivatives hold
conditional on the sourcing pattern of the other parts and we demonstrate that no
change in their sourcing can overturn the result, while still be profitable. The last
24
Figure 7: Sourcing thresholds when South production entails fixed costs
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derivative leads to the following comparative static result: the threshold for South
sourcing of intermediate k depends negatively on the skill intensity of other parts,
i.e. ∂z∗k/∂z˜ ≤ 0. If all elements of the full z vector are weakly higher, the equilibrium
cannot have fewer intermediates produced in South.
For the third result we assume again that the ordering is preserved when inter-
mediates mature. The pattern is the exact opposite from the incomplete contracting
model and it holds for all possible values of the α parameter.
Proposition 6 If production in South involves a fixed cost and zk ≥ zk+1 for all
k, the sourcing thresholds that make the firm indifferent between North and South
sourcing of intermediates k and k + 1 satisfy z∗k ≥ z∗k+1.
With fixed costs, maturity thresholds for successive intermediates are unambigu-
ously decreasing. When one intermediate is offshored, the marginal cost of the final
product declines and its equilibrium output rises. Because α < β the derived de-
mand for each intermediate is certain to increase, which makes it easier to recover
the fixed costs of South production for any intermediates still produced in North.
The interdependence of demand for different intermediates leads unambiguously
to an acceleration in offshoring, i.e. later maturing intermediates make the switch at
a lower level of maturity.23 This effect can be quantitatively important. In the two-
23Note that there is no scope for forward looking behavior by the firm. Each decision is optimal
given the exogenous evolution of the z indices. Variation in z∗ thresholds for different parts is not
the result of myopic behavior as the firm cannot influence any of the parameters that determine
the thresholds.
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intermediate case of Figure 6 with α = 0.1 (red line), the share of low-skill inputs
in the first intermediate has to exceed 0.27 before it can be profitably sourced from
South. The z∗2 threshold for the second part to switch sourcing as well immediately
falls to 0.11 when intermediate one is produced in South. If z1 were to rise to 0.5,
the z∗2 threshold would decline further to 0.04. Only one seventh of z∗1 .
The maturity threshold at which successive intermediates switch optimal produc-
tion to South in the case of 10 intermediates and with the same sequential maturing
as in Figure 4 is illustrated in Figure 7. In the benchmark case of α = β = 0.8
thresholds are constant, as before, but for lower α’s they are weakly declining in the
k ordering. This can be seen best for α = 0.65. For even lower α’s the simultaneous
switching becomes very important, leading to z∗ = 1 for several parts, but still lower
thresholds for later parts.
4 Empirical test
U.S. import statistics for automotive components in Figure 1 suggest a growing im-
portance of imported parts over time. Not only are import volumes higher, countries
gradually export a wider range of components to the United States, in line with the
predictions of our theoretical model. Sourcing of intermediates from low-cost coun-
tries becomes more profitable once they have matured further. This effect would
even operate if sourcing were decided independently for all intermediates.
When demands are interrelated, the two alternative ways we modeled trade fric-
tion produced starkly different predictions on the maturity levels at which successive
intermediates are first offshored. When South production involves incomplete con-
tracts, intermediates that mature sooner are first produced abroad at lower maturity
levels than intermediates that mature later, barring some special cases. The reverse
holds if South production involves fixed costs.
One could say that offshoring is slowing down in the first model, as the maturity
levels at which intermediates are first offshored rise over time, while it is accelerating
in the second model. These opposing predictions could be tested directly if we
observed two pieces of information: the ordering of parts (1, ...,K) and the maturity
levels of parts in the first year they are offshored (z∗k).
The information on U.S. automotive component imports that we use is from the
NBER web site for the 1995-2001 period and from the Global Trade Atlas for 2002-
2006.24. The units of observation are import flows at the country-product-year level.
24The first data source is described in Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) and available at
http://www.nber.org/data/. The second source is maintained by a private company, Global Trade
Information Service, with information at http://www.gtis.com/
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The sample contains products at the 10-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS)
classification within the HS870600, HS870701, HS870790, and HS8708 categories.25
A total of 54 countries record positive exports to the United States for any of these
automotive components over the 12 year sample period.
The parts ordering in the theory is intended to represents a particular feature
of technology—the relative speed at which different intermediates mature—and it
should apply to all countries. We used the method developed by Feenstra and Rose
(2000) to construct a unique ranking of parts, using the country-specific ordering in
which parts are first exports to the United States as inputs. The method aggregates
over the order of initial exports for all countries, with a correction for products that
are skipped by some countries, i.e. never exported to the United States.
We cannot derive a proxy for the maturity thresholds directly from the observed
export flows. Because the rate of maturing over time is not necessarily constant,
the predictions of an accelerating or decelerating offshoring process that we defined
in terms of maturity thresholds does not necessarily translate into accelerating or
decelerating import flows over time. Our solution is to recover a proxy for maturity
from the unit value ratio, i.e. the import price.
We normalize the prices for all ‘South’ countries by the average price of U.S.
imports from Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom for the same product in
the same year. These three countries have high and stable wages over the sample
period and their import prices serve as a proxy for the unobserved North price of
domestic produced parts. The gap between South and North prices serves as a
proxy for the inverse of a part’s maturity.26 If South sourcing only occurs at a very
mature stage, this will show up as a low relative import price as the weight on the
low-skilled input produced with low wages has become large.
Regression results of this proxy for maturity on the parts ordering are reported
in Table 1. We only use the price gap for the first year that a country exports a
part to the United States. To facilitate the interpretation we use the negative of the
logarithm of relative prices as dependent variable in the regressions and we include
country and year fixed effects to control for the general effect of wage differences.
While it is a strong assumption to use the cardinality of the parts ranking as ex-
planatory variable, it serves the illustrative purpose. We also include results where
the parts index is interacted with the simple average of six governance measures
compiled annually by the World Bank.27
A number of findings stand out. First, the overall relationship between the proxy
25While sufficient for our illustrative purpose, it only represents approximately one half of all
automotive component imports. The remainder is spread over sub-categories of automotive com-
ponents within other broad product classes, e.g. HS840820 is “diesel engines for motor vehicles,” or
27
Table 1: Relationship between relative prices and the ordering of parts
Dependent variable is − lnPS/PN
(1) (2) (3) (4)
part index (PI) 0.008*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002)
PI * governance -0.002*
(0.001)
PI * bad governance 0.014***
(0.002)
PI * intermediate governance 0.007***
(0.002)
PI * good governance 0.004* -0.005*
(0.002) (0.003)
No. of observations 3,186 3,186 3,186 203
Notes: A unit of observation is a 10-digit automotive part imported into the Unites States
for the first time by a particular country. PS is the unit value for that import flow and
it is normalized by the average unit value of Japan, Germany, and the U.K. for the same
part in that year. The part index ranks all components in the average order they are first
exported to the United States, constructed as in Feenstra and Rose (2000), and it is the
same for all exporting countries. Column (4) includes only Canada, France, and Mexico.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
for z∗k and the parts ordering is positive, suggesting that offshoring is slowing down.
This pattern cannot be generated by a model with only fixed costs as a trade friction
to delay parts shifting to South. Both frictions might play a role, but the empirical
pattern on the maturity thresholds suggests that incomplete contracts are especially
important.
Second, the positive relationship between the ordering and the maturity is weak-
ened by the quality of governance in the country. It suggests the incomplete con-
tracting model is less dominant for countries with better governance. An alternative
interpretation is that assemblers take advantage of better governance situations to
increase the substitutability of their parts, i.e. be less rigid in their sourcing relation-
ships, which raises the α parameter in the production function and weakens linkage
between parts.
Classifying countries into three groups based on the quality of governance leads
to the same finding. The negative relationship between the parts ordering and
maturity is strongest if governance is bad. Even for the subset of countries with
the best governance, the correlation is still positive, but the coefficient becomes
HS700721 is “Safety glass (laminated) for vehicles.”
26In the theory this is direct because lnACN/ACS = −z lnw.
27Available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance.
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insignificant if the regression is run separately for each group and time dummies
vary.
Finally, in the last column the regression is limited to three countries with ex-
cellent or good governance and with a well developed automotive sector: Canada,
France, and Mexico. The parameter estimate turns negative here. For these three
countries the empirical pattern is consistent with a model of complete contracts and
only fixed costs delaying international sourcing of parts.
5 Conclusions
A model with only final goods can generate the intuitive predictions that goods need
to reach a maturity threshold before they are offshored and that goods maturing
more slowly are offshored later. The interaction of sourcing decisions for interme-
diates that are assembled into the same final good generates some more surprising
predictions.
Foremost, for many predictions it matters crucially how costs associated with
producing in a low-wage location are modeled. First, intermediates that mature at
similar speeds are offshored jointly if South production requires a fixed cost, but
never if contracts with South suppliers are incomplete. Second, in the fixed cost
model offshoring starts later than would be the case for independent products, i.e.
at a higher maturity level, but it starts earlier in the incomplete contracting model.
Third, offshoring of successive intermediates is accelerating in the fixed cost model,
i.e. happening at ever lower maturity levels, but unambiguously slowing down in the
incomplete contracting model if intermediates are substitutes.
An illustrative empirical test of this last prediction using data on U.S. automotive
parts imports suggests that incomplete contracts are a crucial ingredient to explain
the observed patterns. Especially for countries with poor governance, we find that
offshoring of parts is slowing down. Automotive components that were first imported
in the United States only late in the sample period enter at significantly lower
prices than components that entered earlier. We interpret this as having reached
a higher level of maturity. Only for a few countries with good governance and
mature automotive sectors is the pattern consistent with a model without incomplete
contracts and only fixed costs.
Two broader implications of distinguishing between final goods and intermedi-
ates are worth highlighting. First, while we focus on the interrelation of sourcing
decisions, the division of benefits from trade between the final good producer and
individual suppliers also becomes interrelated in our model. It will depend on the
substitutability of intermediates and on the rate at which individual parts mature,
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both of which vary naturally across industries and our model can be used to study
the implications. For example, much of the cost-saving on one intermediate might
not benefit its particular supplier, see Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2010) for an
illustration using the Apple iPod.
Second, the dependency of the maturity threshold of one part on the maturity
and sourcing location of other parts implies that the range of products that a country
produces is not constant. If sourcing decisions were independent, the productivity-
adjusted wage level would fully determine the maturity level for which a product
could be profitably produced in each country. As products mature, their production
would move from country to country in the order of their (productivity-adjusted)
wage, always switching at the same maturity level. In contrast, our model predicts
that at any given time countries will produce products over a range of maturity levels
that overlap with that of other countries. The interrelation of demand for interme-
diates thus weakens the usual prediction of specialization according to comparative
advantage.
In future work, we intend to derive a broader range of predictions from an ex-
tended model with multiple countries. If they can be ranked by unit cost the model
would predict sequential sourcing chains. Combining information on wage and pro-
ductivity differences, we could test predictions on offshoring order, speed, and in-
terdependence. The acceleration or deceleration in offshoring could be evaluated for
industries that differ in the substitutability of intermediates. Industries also differ
in the importance of differentiated inputs, which according to Nunn (2007) is likely
to correlate with the importance of incomplete contracts. A testable prediction of
our model is then that offshoring is more likely to slow down over time in industries
relying more on differentiated inputs.
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Appendix I Proofs for the incomplete contracting model
Proposition 1
We need to show that there exists one and only one cutoff for zk that determines opti-
mal sourcing for intermediate k, given the maturities zL = (z1, ..., zk−1, zk+1, ..., zK)
of all other intermediates.
We first assume that the production mode of all other parts is fixed and denoted
by ML(m1, ...,mk−1,mk+1, ...,mK) with mj ∈ (N,S) ∀j. Conditional on zL, profits
pi(mk,ML) are entirely determined by the production location of all parts. The profit
difference pi(S,ML)− pi(N,ML) is (i) negative at zk = 0, (ii) positive at zk = 1 for
parameters that ensure South sourcing is viable, and (iii) monotonically increasing
in zk. This last feature follows from ∂pi(N,ML)/∂zk = 0 and
∂pi(S,ML)
∂zk
=
( −α
1− α
)
MC
− α
1−α
k pi
K − nS + nSM˜C
− α
1−α
S
lnw β − α
α(1− β) +
nS(1− β2 )M˜C
− α
1−α
S
(K − nS)(1− β) + nS(1− β2 )M˜C
− α
1−α
S
 > 0.
with M˜C
− α
1−α
S = 1/nS
∑
s∈SMC
− α
1−α
s . There must be one and only one cutoff
z∗k(zL,ML) for part k such that profit maximization dictates: if zk < z
∗
k, part k is
produced in North and in South if zk ≥ z∗k.
We next consider that the production mode for other parts can vary. Profits
with k produced in North satisfy ∂pi(N,ML)/∂zk = 0 for each possible ML. For a
given zL, one particular configuration, say ML∗ , will be optimal when k is produced
in North, irrespective of zk. This configuration also satisfies ∂pi(S,ML∗)/∂zk > 0.
Once zk ≥ z∗k(zL,ML∗) and profits with k in South exceed the highest possible
profits with k in North, it is never profitable to produce k in North again if zk does
not fall. 
Corollary 2
According to Corollary 2, it is never optimal to switch more than one part from
North to South at the same moment. We demonstrate this for part k and part k+1,
when the skill intensity of all other parts is fixed. Use pi(mk,mk+1,ML) to denote
the profit when part k and k + 1 are produced as mk and mk+1, and other parts
according to ML.
Assume it is optimal that both parts k and k + 1 switch from North to South
simultaneously. In that case, the following equation implicitly defines the two cutoffs
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z∗k and z
∗
k+1
pi(N,N,ML) = pi(S, S,M ′L)
It allows for the possibility that M ′L differs from ML. If simultaneous switching were
indeed optimal, it implies that both profits above are higher than pi(S,N,ML) at
z∗k. Suppose pi(N,N,ML) = pi(S, S,M
′
L) = xpi(S,N,ML) with x ≥ 1.
Note that we can write the profit equation for any sourcing configuration as
pi(•) = K−
β
α(1−β)
(
MC
− α
1−α
k +MC
− α
1−α
k+1 + (K − 2) · M˜C
− α
1−α
L
) β−α
α(1−β) ×[
(1− βτk)MC
− α
1−α
k + (1− βτk+1)MC
− α
1−α
k+1 + (K − 2)(1− βτ˜L)M˜C
− α
1−α
L
]
= y(•) × [mark-up(•)]
always using the appropriate marginal costs and mark-ups for the chosen sourcing
configuration mk, mk+1, and ML: MCj = 1 and τj = 1 if mj = N and MCj = wzj
and τj = 1/2 if mj = S. The aggregates are then defined as (K − 2)M˜C−
α
1−α
L =∑
l 6=k,k+1MC
− α
1−α
l and (K − 2)(1− βτ˜L)M˜C
− α
1−α
L =
∑
l 6=k,k+1(1− βτl)MC
− α
1−α
l .
Given that the mark-up is a sum of K terms, we can decompose it linearly in the
(N,S,M ′L) sourcing configuration as
mark-up(N,S,M ′L) = mark-up(N,N,ML) + mark-up(S, S,M
′
L)−mark-up(S,N,ML).
Next, we substitute in the profit definition
pi(N,S,M ′L)
y(N,S,M ′L)
=
pi(N,N,ML)
y(N,N,ML)
+
pi(S, S,M ′L)
y(S, S,M ′L)
− pi(S,N,ML)
y(S,N,ML)
,
and re-write it using the earlier equalities as we evaluate the expressions at z∗k and
z∗k+1
pi(N,S,M ′L)
y(N,S,M ′L)
=
pi(N,N,ML)
y(N,N,ML)
+
pi(N,N,ML)
y(S, S,M ′L)
− pi(N,N,ML)
xy(S,N,ML)
,
to find
pi(N,S,M ′L)
pi(N,N,ML)
= y(N,S,M ′L)
(
1
y(N,N,ML)
+
1
y(S, S,M ′L)
− 1
xy(S,N,ML)
)
.
This expression is increasing in x. The concavity of the 1/y(•) function makes that
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at x = 1 we can sign the right-hand term:28
pi(N,S,M ′L)
pi(N,N,ML)
> 1.
These calculations indicate that at z∗k and z
∗
k+1 the firm would make higher profits
if only k were sourced in North and k + 1 in South, rather than having both parts
sourced in the same location. This contradicts the optimality of a simultaneous
switch of both parts. 
Proposition 3
The assumption that zk+1 ≤ zk and the result in Corollary 2 that parts will not
switch sourcing at the same time, guarantees that part k will already be produced
in South when part zk+1 reaches its sourcing threshold. The zero profit condition
that pins down z∗k+1 is the following
(
(K − k) + k · M˜C−
α
1−α
S
) β−α
α(1−β)
(
(1− β)(K − k) + (1− β
2
)k · M˜C−
α
1−α
S
)
=
(
(K − k − 1) +MC∗−
α
1−α
k+1 + k · M˜C
− α
1−α
S
) β−α
α(1−β)(
(1− β)(K − k − 1) + (1− β
2
)(MC
∗− α
1−α
k+1 + k · M˜C
− α
1−α
S )
)
Applying the implicit function theorem to the above equation reveals that
sign(∂z∗k+1/∂z˜S) = sign(α).
When α > 0, the minimum z∗k+1 is achieved at the minimum z˜S . By definition,
z˜S is the average zj for all parts j = 1, ..., k already sourced from South (with
necessarily zj ≥ z∗j and, recall, zj ≥ zk+1). Therefore, the lowest possible z˜S will be
z∗k+1 itself, which is achieved only if z1 = ... = zk = z
∗
k+1. It must be the case that
z∗k ≤ z∗k+1. 
We illustrate why the proposition might not hold down when α < 0. Now the
minimum z∗k+1 is achieved at z˜S = 1. Use pi(mk,mk+1, z˜S) to denote the profit
function when parts k and k + 1 are produced in mk and mk+1 and the k − 1
parts (out of K−2) that are produced in South are characterized by z˜S . The lowest
possible threshold for z∗k+1 is thus defined as pi(S,N, 1) = pi(S, S, 1), with also zk = 1,
28This can be seen from the following inequality:
y(N,N,ML)
−1 + y(S, S,M ′L)
−1 > y(N,S,M ′L)
−1 + y(S,N,ML)
−1
35
i.e.,
[z∗k+1]
(
(K − k) + k(2w)− α1−α
) β−α
α(1−β) ×
(
(1− β)(K − k) + (1− β
2
)k(2w)−
α
1−α
)
=
(
(K − k − 1) +MC∗−
α
1−α
k+1 + k(2w)
− α
1−α
) β−α
α(1−β) ×(
(1− β)(K − k − 1) + (1− β
2
)(MC
∗− α
1−α
k+1 + k(2w)
− α
1−α )
)
The highest possible threshold for z∗k is achieved when z˜S = z
∗
k and defined by
pi(N,N, z∗k) = pi(S,N, z
∗
k), i.e.,
[z∗k]
(
(K − k + 1) + (k − 1)M˜C∗−
α
1−α
k
) β−α
α(1−β) ×(
(1− β)(K − k + 1) + (1− β
2
)(k − 1)M˜C∗−
α
1−α
k
)
=
(
(K − k) + kM˜C∗−
α
1−α
k
) β−α
α(1−β)
(
(1− β)(K − k) + (1− β
2
)kM˜C
∗− α
1−α
k
)
Note that pi(S,N, 1), the left hand side of [z∗k+1], is always larger than pi(S,N, z
∗
k),
the right hand side of [z∗k]. Assume that xpi(S,N, 1)|zk=1 = pi(S,N, z∗k)|zk=z∗k =
pi(N,N, z∗k)|zk=z∗k with 0 < x ≤ 1.
As in the previous case for α > 0, we verify whether z∗k+1 ≥ z∗k as this implies
directly that in all situations z∗k+1 ≥ z∗k. We do this by evaluating the equality that
defines z∗k+1 at zk+1 = z
∗
k. Because pi(S, S, 1) is increasing in zk+1, we know that
if [pi(S,N, 1) − pi(S, S, 1)]zk+1=z∗k ≥ 0 the sourcing threshold for part k + 1 must be
higher than this value, and thus z∗k+1 ≥ z∗k ≥ z∗k.
We use the same approach as for the proof of Corollary 2 in Appendix A.3. Profits
can be written as the product of output and a mark-up term. Because the latter
is a sum over all parts, it can be re-written as the combination of the mark-ups in
three different configurations:
pi(S, S, 1)|zk+1=z∗k = y(S, S, 1)
[
pi(S,N, 1)
y(S,N, 1)
+
pi(S,N, z∗k)
y(S,N, z∗k)
− pi(N,N, z
∗
k)
y(N,N, z∗k)
]
Substituting in the above two equalities, we obtain
pi(S, S, 1)|zk+1=z∗k = y(S, S, 1)
[
pi(S,N, 1)
y(S,N, 1)
+
xpi(S,N, 1)
y(S,N, z∗k)
− xpi(S,N, 1)
y(N,N, z∗k)
]
and thus
pi(S, S, 1)
pi(S,N, 1)
|zk+1=z∗k = y(S, S, 1)
[
1
y(S,N, 1)
+
x
y(S,N, z∗k)
− x
y(N,N, z∗k)
]
,
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which is increasing in x because y(S,N, z∗k) < y(N,N, z
∗
k).
29
Similar to Appendix A.3, the right-hand side is positive when x = 1. Hence,
for x → 1 it will be true that pi(S, S, 1) − pi(S,N, 1)]zk+1=z∗k > 1 and the prediction
Proposition 6 will still hold. Recall that x is defined as
pi(S,N,z∗k)|zk=z∗k
pi(S,N,1)|zk=1
, which is the
inverse of the profit gap when the maturities of all k South sourced parts increases
from z∗k to 1. If this difference is small, the proposition will still hold and z
∗
k+1 ≥ z∗k.
On the contrary, if the profit difference is large, there might be cases where z∗k+1 < z
∗
k.
The probability of this happening is lower when z∗k is already high.
29Multiplying through the y(S, S, 1) factor, the first term on the right captures the lower output
when more parts are sourced in South, while the next two terms capture the net increase in profit
margin, which is increasing in x.
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Appendix II Proofs for the fixed cost model
Proposition 4
The proof of Proposition 4 follows the same logic as that of Proposition 1. At zk = 0,
the fixed costs involved in South production guarantee that pi(N,ML) = pi(S,ML)+
f > pi(S,ML) and intermediate k is produced in North. We limit attention to
the case where at zk = 1 the profits satisfy pi(N,ML) ≤ pi(S,ML) − f , i.e. South
production is optimal at some maturity level.30 Because ∂pi(N,ML)/∂zk = 0 and
∂pi(S,ML)
∂zk
= −βK−
β
α(1−β)
c− α1−αk + ∑
j∈ML
c
− α
1−α
j

β(1−α)
α(1−β)−1
c
− 1
1−α
k ·
∂ck
∂zk
> 0,
the difference pi(N,ML)− pi(S,ML) declines monotonically with zk. There must be
one and only one cutoff z∗k(zL,ML) for part k such that profit maximization dictates:
if zk < z∗k, part k is produced in North and in South if zk ≥ z∗k.
Even when ML is not fixed, a change in the sourcing of other parts can never
make North sourcing of k profitable again if zk exceeds the threshold that makes
South production more profitable than the highest possible profit with part k in
North. Hence, for any zk < z∗k, part k will be produced in North; while for any
zk ≥ z∗k, part k is produced is South. 
Corollary 5
To prove Corollary 5, we only need to show that once part k is produced in South
even a change in zL, possibly accompanied with a change in ML, will not make North
production of part k profitable again either. Due to the series of bilateral contracts,
a change in ML only enters the above profit functions through its effect on c˜
− α
1−α
L
and nL. Following the reasoning above, each possible ML leads to a unique cutoff
that governs optimal sourcing of component k and we denote it by z∗k(zL,ML).
Consider two alternative choices of ML: MA and MB. Let’s assume that c˜AL < c˜
B
L ,
which requires that choice A has more parts produced in South (nA > nB), otherwise
B would be dominated and never chosen.31 Note that the slope of the marginal profit
function (∂pi/∂zk) is declining in c˜L,
∂2pi(S, ·)
∂zk∂c˜L
=
β(β − α)
(1− β)(1− α)K
− β
α(1−β) [c
− α
1−α
k +(K−1)c˜
− α
1−α
L ]
β(1−α)
α(1−β)−2c
− 1
1−α
k c˜
− 1
1−α
L ·
∂ck
∂zk
< 0,
30This is not a necessary condition because the possibility of changing ML can trigger a boost in
derived demand for intermediate k, which facilitates offshoring for given zk.
31We use strict rather than weak inequalities, otherwise one of the plans would still weakly
dominate the other.
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which implies that ∂pi(S,MA)/∂zk > ∂pi(S,MB)/∂zk.
One possibility is that pi(N,MA) ≥ pi(N,MB), which implies pi(S,MA) ≥ pi(S,MB)
for zk = 0. Given the steeper marginal profit function for A, pi(S,MA) ≥ pi(S,MB)
for all possible zk. A dominates B and the unique cutoff z∗k(zL,M
A) is the only
one relevant to determine optimal sourcing for part k (all other parts are produced
according to MA for any value of zk).
The other possibility is that pi(N,MA) < pi(N,MB), which implies pi(S,MA) <
pi(S,MB) for zk = 0. The steeper slope of pi(S,MA) against zk leads to the following
three cases:
1. pi(S,MA) < pi(S,MB) even for zk = 1: then plan B dominates A and
z∗k(zL,M
B) is the only relevant cutoff determining optimal sourcing of part
k.
2. pi(S,MA) cuts pi(S,MB) at z∗∗ ∈ (z∗k(zL,MB), 1): then z∗k(zL,MB) is the
cutoff for component k, and MB is chosen when zk is very small until zk
reaches z∗∗.
3. pi(S,MA) cuts pi(S,MB) at z∗∗∗ ∈ (0, z∗k(zL,MB)): then z∗∗∗ is the relevant
cutoff value for component k. MB is chosen while zk is relatively small and k
is produced in North. When zk reaches the cutoff point, not only component
k is switched to South production, but also all other parts are now produced
according to MA, which sources more other components from South as well.
In each case, once the lower variable cost combination MA is chosen, MB cannot
dominate MA with further increase in zk, which is Corollary 5. 
Proposition 6
Given the assumption that the component index order is fixed, it generally has to
be true that if component k is offshored, any component with index l < k (and thus
with lower skill intensity) should be offshored as well. Otherwise, the firm can raise
profits by switching k to North and produce the lower index component in South
instead. It would incur the same fixed costs, but lower variable cost.
There are two possibilities for part k+1. It will either be offshored first when part
k is already produced in South, or both parts can switch sourcing simultaneously.
In the latter case, z∗k+1 ≤ z∗k is directly satisfied by the definition of the index order.
We only need to show that the same inequality holds in the first case, when
component k is already sourced from South when k + 1 first moves there. When
zk reaches the z∗k threshold, components with index higher than k are still sourced
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from North. The cutoff z∗k is defined as
pi(N,N,ML) = pi(S,N,M ′L). (∗)
The first arguments denote the production location of component k, the second
arguments component k + 1, and the last arguments the production choice of all
other components.
There are two possibilities for M ′L. First, if component k switches to South
production when component k − 1 is already produced there, then M ′L = ML.
Second, if component k is switched to South simultaneously with component k − 1,
M ′L is a combination with lower variable cost and higher fixed cost than ML. Note
that the definition also implies that pi(N,N,ML)|zk=z∗k ≥ pi(N,N,M ′L)|zk=z∗k , which
will be used later.
The cutoff z∗k+1 can be defined similarly as
pi(S,N,M ′L) = pi(S, S,M
′′
L). (∗∗)
M ′′L equals M
′
L if part k + 1 switches sourcing alone, or it can be a lower variable
cost higher fixed cost combination where some components with index higher than
k + 1 switch sourcing to South simultaneously.
Because the LHS of the z∗k+1 definition (**) is constant in zk+1 and the RHS is
increasing, z∗k+1 ≤ z∗k will be satisfied if pi(S,N,M ′L)|zk+1=z∗k ≤ pi(S, S,M ′′L)|zk+1=z∗k .
A sufficient condition for this is
pi(S,N,M ′L)|zk+1=z∗k ≤ pi(S, S,M ′L)|zk+1=z∗k SC
We can show this condition must be satisfied as follows. Define c∗ as cS evaluated
at z∗k, c
S
k+ as c
S evaluated at zk ≥ z∗k, and (c˜′L)−α
′
as the average marginal cost for the
(K−2) parts in M ′L using the earlier aggregation scheme. Also define α′ = α/(1−α),
β′ = β/(1 − β). If β > α > 0, −α′ < 0 such that (cSk+)−α
′
> (c∗)−α′ > (cN )−α′ .
Moreover, g(x) = xβ
′/α′ will be a convex function and the following inequality will
then hold:
[
(cN )−α
′
+ (cN )−α
′
+ (K − 2)(c˜′L)−α
′] β′α′ + [(cSk+)−α′ + (c∗)−α′ + (K − 2)(c˜′L)−α′] β′α′
>
[
(c∗)−α
′
+ (cN )−α
′
+ (K − 2)(c˜′L)−α
′] β′α′ + [(cSk+)−α′ + (cN )−α′ + (K − 2)(c˜′L)−α′] β′α′
If α < 0, the inverse inequalities apply, (cSk+)
−α′ < (c∗)−α′ < (cN )−α′ , but the g(x)
function becomes concave leading to the same overall inequality.
Multiplying both sides by (1− β)K−β′/α and adding 2f + 2I ′Lf , we can rewrite
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the inequality as
pi(N,N,M ′L)|zk=z∗k + pi(S, S,M ′L)|zk+1=z∗k > pi(S,N,M ′L)|zk=z∗k + pi(S,N,M ′L)|zk+1=z∗k
pi(N,N,ML)|zk=z∗k + pi(S, S,M ′L)|zk+1=z∗k > pi(S,N,M ′L)|zk=z∗k + pi(S,N,M ′L)|zk+1=z∗k
pi(S, S,M ′L)|zk+1=z∗k > pi(S,N,M ′L)|zk+1=z∗k
The substitution in the second line strengthens the inequality, as indicated with the
definition of z∗k. The definition of z
∗
k itself allows the elimination of the first terms on
both sides altogether. Hence we find that the sufficient condition holds with strict
inequality.
In other words, when zk+1 = z∗k , producing part k+ 1 in South generates higher
profit than producing it at North. This must mean that the actual cutoff value
z∗k+1 ≤ z∗k. 
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